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Abstract
We propose a probabilistic variant of the pi-calculus as a framework to specify
randomized security protocols and their intended properties. In order to express
and verify the correctness of the protocols, we develop a probabilistic version of
the testing semantics. We then illustrate these concepts on an extended example:
the Partial Secret Exchange, a protocol which uses a randomized primitive, the
Oblivious Transfer, to achieve fairness of information exchange between two parties.
1 Introduction
Probabilistic security protocols involve probabilistic choices and are used for
many purposes including signing contracts, sending certified email and pro-
tecting the anonymity of communication agents. Some probabilistic protocols
rely on specific random primitives such as the Oblivious Transfer ([14]). There
are various examples in this category, notably the contract signing protocol in
[6] and the privacy-preserving auction protocol in [9].
A large effort has been dedicated to the formal verification of security pro-
tocols, and several approaches based on process-calculi techniques have been
proposed. However, in the particular case of probabilistic protocols, they have
been analyzed mainly by using model checking methods, while only few at-
tempts of applying process calculi techniques have been made. One proposal
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of this kind is [2], which defines a probabilistic version of the noninterfer-
ence property, and uses a probabilistic variant of CCS and of bisimulation to
analyze protocols wrt this property.
In this paper we present a framework for analyzing probabilistic security proto-
cols using the piprob-calculus, a probabilistic extension of the pi-calculus inspired
by the work in [7]. In order to express security properties in this calculus, we
extend the notion of testing equivalence ([10]) to the probabilistic setting. We
propose a preorder based on the probability of passing a certain class of tests:
a process P is considered smaller than a process Q, written P v Q, if, for each
test, the probability of passing the test is smaller for P than for Q. Following
the lines of [1], a test can be seen as an adversary who interacts with an agent
in order to break some security property. In order to check that a protocol
P satisfies a security property, then, we can create a specification Q which
“obviously satisfies” the property and show that P v Q. If this holds, then
the adversary has smaller probability of succeeding with the protocol than
with the specification, so the protocol is correct with respect to the intended
property.
From a pragmatic point of view, if the protocol P is given, then it is best
to construct a specification P ′ which has the same structure than P . This
is because v is actually a congruence, so we can prove that P v P ′ in a
compositional way. This step can be repeated until we have a specification
Q which is “obviously correct”. In other words, we may construct several
intermediate specifications: P = P1, P2, . . . , Pn = Q where for each i we prove
Pi v Pi+1, and Q is obviously satisfying the specification.
We illustrate the framework with an extended example of fair exchange proto-
col, where the property to verify is fairness. In this kind of protocol two agents,
A and B, want to exchange information simultaneously, namely each of them
is willing to send its secrets only if he receives the ones of the other party.
We consider the Partial Secrets Exchange protocol (PSE, [6]) which uses the
Oblivious Transfer as its main primitive. An important characteristic of the
fair exchange protocols is that the adversary is in fact one of the agents and
not an external party. As a consequence the behavior of A will be different
when B behaves normally from the case in which B is trying to cheat. After
encoding the protocol in the piprob-calculus, we give a specification which mod-
els the behavior of A. We then express fairness by means of a testing relation
between the protocol and the specification and we prove that it holds.
Note that a proof of the correctness of PSE was already given in [6], but it
was rather informal and relying on intuition. In contrast, the proof given in
this paper is rigorous and detailed, as it relies on a framework (the semantics
of the probabilistic pi-calculus) which is completely formalized. Additionally,
the method for proving P v P ′ can be automatized, at least in part.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we introduce
piprob, our variant of the probabilistic pi-calculus. We present its semantics
and propose a notion of probabilistic testing preorder. In Section 3 we illus-
trate the Oblivious Transfer primitive, the Partial Secrets Exchange protocol
(PSE), and their encoding in the piprob-calculus. In Section 4 we specify the
fairness property and we prove the correctness of PSE. In Section 5 we dis-
cuss related work, notably the analysis of the PSE protocol using probabilistic
model checking. Finally, Section 6 concludes and presents some ideas for future
work.
A preliminary version of this paper, without proofs, appeared in [3]. Apart
from the addition of the proofs, this paper differs from the preliminary ver-
sion in the fact that there is now a unique specification for the PSE protocol,
instead of many specifications depending on how the partner may cheat. Con-
sequently the correctness proof gets more convincing and simplified.
2 A probabilistic variant of the pi-calculus
In this section we define a probabilistic process calculus suitable for imple-
menting security protocols. This calculus, which will be referred as the piprob-
calculus, is a probabilistic extension of the pi-calculus, similar to the proba-
bilistic asynchronous pi-calculus presented in [7].
A common feature of piprob and the calculus in [7] is that there is a distinction
between probabilistic and non-deterministic behavior. The former, represented
by the choice operator, is associated with the random choices performed by
the process itself. The latter, represented by the parallel operator, is related
to the decisions of an external scheduler.
The piprob-calculus differs from the calculus in [7] in that it allows only blind
(probabilistic) choices. This simplifies considerably semantics and reasoning,
while the calculus remains rich enough to model probabilistic security pro-
tocols. Furthermore, the piprob-calculus contains some extra constructs, like
output prefix and pair splitting, that are useful to express the protocols we
have considered.
We could also add certain cryptographic primitives like the shared-key en-
cryption of the spi-calculus, however this is not necessary for the protocols
considered in this paper.
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M,N ::= terms
x variable
| n name
| 〈M,N〉 pair
P,Q ::= processes
MN.P output
| M(x).P input
| P | Q composition
| ∑i piPi prob. choice
| νnP restriction
| !P replication
| [M is N ]P match
| let 〈x, y〉 = M in P pair splitting
| 0 nil
Fig. 1. Syntax of piprob-calculus
2.1 Syntax
Let x, y range over a countable set of variables and n,m over a countable set
of channel names. The terms and processes of the piprob-calculus are defined
by the grammar displayed in figure 1. The distinction between variables and
channel names does not exist in the original pi-calculus but simplifies the
treatment of some relations. Note also that for notational simplicity we will
sometimes use M. to represent the prefix Mn. where n is some fixed name.
2.2 Probabilistic automata
The semantics of piprob is based on the Segala and Lynch’s version of Prob-
abilistic Automata, which was introduced in [15]. We briefly recall here the
main notions, simplified and adapted for our needs.
A discrete probabilistic space is a pair (X, pb) whereX is a set and pb a function
pb : X 7→ (0, 1] s.t. ∑x∈X pb(x) = 1. Given a set Y we define the set of all
probabilistic spaces on Y :
Prob(Y ) = {(X, pb) | X ⊆ Y and (X, pb) is a discrete probabilistic space}
Let S be a set of states and A a set of actions. A probabilistic automaton is a
triple (S, T , s0) where s0 ∈ S (initial state) and T ⊆ S × Prob(A × S). The
elements of T are called transition groups or steps. The idea is that the choice
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between transition groups is made non-deterministically by an external sched-
uler while the choice of a transition within a group is made probabilistically
by the process itself. 1
Given a probabilistic automatonM = (S, T , s0) we define tree(M) as the tree
obtained by unfolding the transition system. The root n0 of tree(M) is labeled
by s0 and if n is a node labeled by s then for each (s, (X, pb)) ∈ T and each
(µ, s′) ∈ X there is a node n′ labeled by s′ and an arc from n to n′ labeled by
µ and pb(µ, s′).
A scheduler ζ is a function which solves the nondeterminism by selecting, at
each moment of the computation, a transition group among the ones allowed
at the current state. The execution tree of an automaton M under a scheduler
ζ, denoted by etree(M, ζ) is the tree obtained from tree(M) by pruning all
the arcs corresponding to transitions in groups not selected by ζ.
2.3 Semantics of piprob
The operational semantics of the piprob-calculus is given by means of proba-
bilistic automata defined inductively on the basis of the syntax. In order to
simplify the notation, we write
s { µi−→
pi
si | i ∈ I}
iff (s, ({(µi, si) | i ∈ I}, pb)) ∈ T and ∀i ∈ I : pi = pb(µi, si), where I is an
index set. When I is not relevant we will use the notation s { µi−→
pi
si}i.
The transitions of the automaton associated to a process are defined by the
rules in Figure 2.
The behavior of the choice operator is defined by the SUM rule. The transition
to every member of the sum is possible with a τ action (blind choice). Note
that all transitions belong to the same group which means that the choice
is not controlled by the scheduler but is made by the process itself. IN and
OUT are self-explanatory. The RES rules model restriction on channel n:
actions on that channel are not allowed by the restricted process. Note that
we have two rules for the sake of clarity: for the transition groups which
contain only τ actions there is no need to check the channel name. PAR
1 For piprob we actually need only a subset of P.A., namely we can restrict to the case
in which the second component of a transition is either a singleton (a probabilistic
distribution which is 1 on exactly one pair label-state) or it is a distribution which
is positive only on τ labels. This restricted class of automata is similar (although
not identical) to the so-called simple probabilistic automata.
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IN m(x).P {m(x)−→
1
P} OUT mM.P {mM−→
1
P}
SUM
∑
i piPi { τ−→pi Pi}i OPEN
P { mn−→
1
P ′}
νnP {m(n)−→
1
P ′}
m 6= n
RES1
P { µ−→
1
P ′}
νnP { µ−→
1
νnP ′}
µ 6=τ,
n/∈nm(µ) RES2
P { τ−→
pi
Pi}i
νnP { τ−→
pi
νnPi}i
COM
P {mM−→
1
P ′} Q {m(x)−→
1
Q′}
P | Q { τ−→
1
P ′ | Q′[M/x]} PAR
P { µi−→
pi
Pi}i
P | Q { µi−→
pi
Pi | Q}i
∀i fn(µi) ∩ bn(Q) = ∅
CLOSE
P {m(n)−→
1
P ′} Q {m(x)−→
1
Q′}
P | Q { τ−→
1
νn(P ′ | Q′[n/x])} CONG
P ≡ P ′ P ′ { µi−→
pi
Q′i}i ∀i.Q′i ≡ Qi
P { µi−→
pi
Qi}i
Fig. 2. The late-instantiation semantics of the piprob-calculus. The functions fn,bn
and nm give the free, bound and total names of their argument respectively.
models interleaving, in which each process maintains its transition groups.
COM models communication by handshaking. Since input/output transitions
are always alone in their group, this rule is rather simple and very similar
to the non-probabilistic case. CLOSE is similar to COM but works together
with OPEN in order to implement scope extrusion, that is the transfer of a
new channel name between processes. Finally CONG states that equivalent
processes perform the same actions. The structural equivalence ≡ used in
CONG is defined as follows:
(α-renaming) P ≡ Q iff P ≡α Q P | Q ≡ Q | P
P | 0 ≡ P !P ≡ P | !P
let 〈x, y〉 = 〈M,N〉 in P ≡ P [M/x][N/y] [M is M ]P ≡ P
In the following sections we define some relations between piprob processes which
will help us expressing some properties of probabilistic protocols and reasoning
about them. We will also examine some properties of these relations.
2.4 Testing relations between piprob processes
Testing is a well-known method of comparing processes, resulting in equiv-
alences weaker than the ones of the bisimulation family. The idea, proposed
by De Nicola and Hennessy ([10]), is that two processes are equivalent if they
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both pass the same set of tests. A test is a process running in parallel with the
one being tested and which can perform a distinguished action ω that repre-
sents success. This idea is very useful for the analysis of security protocols, as
suggested in [1], since a test can be seen as an adversary who interferes with
a communication agent and declares his success with an ω action. Then two
processes are testing equivalent if they are vulnerable to the same attacks.
In the probabilistic setting there are different approaches for defining testing
equivalence. For example [13] proposes a probabilistic extension of testing
equivalence which considers the ability of each process to pass a test with
non-zero probability (may testing) or probability one (must testing). However,
when analyzing security protocols we are not only interested in the ability of
passing a test, but also in the exact probability of success. Thus our definition
resembles more the one of [8] and the result is no longer an equivalence but a
preorder.
We start by defining the probability of a set of executions. Given a probabilistic
automaton M and a scheduler ζ, an execution fragment ξ is a path (finite or
infinite) from the root of etree(M, ζ). The probability of an execution fragment
ξ = n0
µ0−→
p0
n1
µ1−→
p1
n2
µ2−→
p2
. . . is defined as pb(ξ) =
∏
i pi. An execution is a
maximal execution fragment. The set of all executions ofM under ζ is denoted
by exec(M, ζ).
Given an execution fragment ξ, a cone with prefix ξ is defined as Cξ = {ξ′ ∈
exec(M, ζ) | ξ ≤ ξ′} where ≤ is the prefix relation. We define pb(Cξ) = pb(ξ).
Let {Ci}i∈I be a countable set of disjoint cones. We define pb(⋃i∈I Ci) =∑
i∈I pb(Ci). We can show that this probability is well defined, that is two
different sets of disjoint cones with the same union give the same probability.
A test O is a piprob-calculus process able to perform a distinguished action ω. An
interaction between O and a process P is a sequence of τ transitions starting
from P |O. In order to allow only τ actions we define νP = νn1 . . . νnkP , where
n1, . . . , nk are all the free names in P . Then an interaction between P and O
is an element of exec(ν(P |O), ζ) 2 :
ν(P |O) = Q0 τ−→
p0
Q1
τ−→
p1
Q2
τ−→
p2
. . .
An interaction ξ is successful if Qi
ω−→
p
for some i. Let sexec(ν(P |O), ζ) =
{ξ ∈ exec(ν(P |O), ζ) | ξ is successful}. This set can be obtained as a countable
union of disjoint cones ([7]), so the probability of a successful execution can
be defined as pb(sexec(ν(P |O), ζ)).
2 With a slight abuse of notation we will sometimes use a process to denote its
corresponding probabilistic automaton.
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We now define the upper and lower probability for P to pass O.
Definition 1 Let P be a process and O a test. We define
P dOe=sup{pb(sexec(ν(P | O), ζ)) | ζ is a scheduler}
P bOc= inf{pb(sexec(ν(P | O), ζ)) | ζ is a scheduler}
Then we define the testing preorders for piprob-processes.
Definition 2 Let P,Q be processes. We define must and may-testing pre-
orders as follows:
P v may Q iff for all tests O : P dOe ≤ QdOe
P v must Q iff for all tests O : P bOc ≤ QbOc
In this paper we will only use may-testing to express safety properties of
security protocols, so we will write just v for v may .
Finally we define a useful preorder between pairs of processes:
Definition 3 Let P1, P2, Q1, Q2 be processes. We define the relation vp be-
tween pairs of processes as follows
(P1, P2) vp (Q1, Q2) iff P1 +p P2 v Q1 +p Q2
where P1 +p P2 stands for
∑2
i=1 piPi with p1 = p and p2 = 1− p.
2.5 Properties of testing preorders
In this section we examine some properties of the previously defined relations.
The following lemma is very useful for reasoning about the upper probability
of passing a test. It crucially relies on the fact that in piprob probabilistic choices
are blind.
Lemma 4 Let P,Q be piprob processes and p ∈ [0, 1]. Then for all tests O
P +p QdOe = pP dOe+ (1− p)QdOe
Proof. We will write P (O, ζ) for pr(sexec(ν(P |O), ζ)). Firstly we prove that
∃ζ : P +p Q(O, ζ) = pi ⇔ ∃ζ1, ζ2 : pP (O, ζ1) + (1− p)Q(O, ζ2) = pi (1)
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⇒) we can construct a scheduler ζ ′ which performs the choice first and then
imitates ζ. It is easy to see that P +p Q(O, ζ) = P +p Q(O, ζ
′). Moreover
all executions of P +p Q | O under ζ ′ will start with one of the following
transitions:
P +p Q | O τ−→
1
P | O P +p Q | O τ−→
1−p Q | O
and continue with an execution of P |O or Q|O. Thus P (O, ζ ′) = pP (O, ζ1) +
(1 − p)Q(O, ζ2) = pi, where ζ1, ζ2 are schedulers which imitate ζ ′ after the
choice.
⇐) we use for ζ a scheduler which first selects to do the choice P +p Q and
then imitates ζ1 or ζ2 depending on the outcome of the choice.
Now let A = pP dOe+(1−p)QdOe and suppose that A 6= sup{P+pQ(O, ζ) | ζ}.
Then, by definition of sup, one of the following must hold.
(1) ∃ζ : P+pQ(O, ζ) > A. Then by (1) ∃ζ1, ζ2 : pP (O, ζ1)+(1−p)Q(O, ζ2) >
A, so P (O, ζ1) > P dOe or Q(O, ζ2) > QdOe which is a contradiction.
(2) ∃A′ < A s.t. ∀ζ : P (O, ζ) ≤ A′. Let ² < A − A′. Since P dOe, QdOe are
the sup of the corresponding sets, there exist ζ1, ζ2 s.t. pP (O, ζ1) + (1−
p)Q(O, ζ2) > A − e. By (1) ∃ζ : P +p Q(O, ζ) > A − e > A′ which is a
also contradiction.
2
A context C is a process containing a “hole”. We will denote by C[P ] the pro-
cess obtained by replacing the hole in C by P . A preorder is a precongruence if
it is closed under any context. May-testing is not a precongruence on arbitrary
processes since for P = [x is y]P ′, Q = [x is z]Q′, C = n(x).[ ], we have P v Q
but C[P ] v C[Q] does not hold for all P ′, Q′. However all previous relations
become precongruences if we restrict to closed processes.
Definition 5 A process is called closed if it contains no free variables.
Remark 6 Because of the distinction between variables and channel names,
a closed process can still have free channel names and therefore be able to
communicate with the environment.
Lemma 7 v is a precongruence on closed processes.
Proof. Instead of proving directly the congruence of v we will use the notion
of open extension of a relation. If R is a relation on closed processes, we
define its open extension R◦ on arbitrary processes as P R◦ Q iff Pσ R Qσ
for all substitutions σ such that Pσ,Qσ are closed. We now prove that v◦ is
a congruence.
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Let P,Q be processes such that P v◦ Q. By the definition of v◦ we have:
∀O∀σ PσdOe ≤ QσdOe (2)
The proof is done by induction on the structure of C. The base case (C = [])
is trivial. For the inductive step, we can apply the induction hypothesis to
each sub-context, so we have only to examine the following cases.
(1) C = [] | R. The process Rσ | O is by itself a test and it is easy to see
that ∀X : X | RσdOe = XdRσ | Oe. So we have:
(Pσ | Rσ)dOe = PσdRσ | Oe ≤ QσdRσ | Oe = (Qσ | Rσ)dOe
thus C[P ] v◦ C[Q].
(2) C = [] +k R. We have
(Pσ +k Rσ)dOe = kPσdOe+ (1− k)RσdOe lemma 4
≤ kQσdOe+ (1− k)RσdOe (2)
= (Qσ +k Rσ)dOe lemma 4
thus C[P ] v◦ C[Q].
(3) C = M(x).[]. Firstly we α-rename C[X] to M(x′).X ′ where x′ is a
fresh variable and X ′ = X[x′/x]. By applying a substitution σ we get
Mσ(x′).X ′σ.
Without loss of generality we are considering tests which are not per-
forming any actions by themselves before interacting with the tested pro-
cess. So all applications of a test O to Mσ(x′).X ′σ will start with the
following transition:
ν(Mσ(x′).X ′σ | O) τ−→
1
ν(X ′σ[N/x′] | O′)
Since the probability of this transition is 1 we have
(Mσ(x′).X ′σ)dOe = X ′σ[N/x′]dO′e (3)
Finally (note that σ[N/x′] is a substitution)
Mσ(x′).P ′σdOe = P ′σ[N/x′]dO′e (3)
≤ Q′σ[N/x′]dO′e (2)
= Mσ(x′).Q′σdOe (3)
= C[Q]σdOe (α-conv)
thus C[P ] v◦ C[Q].
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(4) C = MN.[]. Similar to the previous case.
(5) C =![]. First we prove that
P n v◦ Qn,∀n ≥ 1 (4)
where P n = P | . . . | P (n times). The proof is by induction on n and the
inductive case is similar to case 1 above (considering P | O and P n | O
as tests).
Now suppose that !PσdOe >!QσdOe. By choosing a sufficiently large
n we can approximate !P, !Q with P n, Qn without invalidating the above
inequality, which is contradictory to (4).
(6) C = [M is N ][]. We have C[X]σ = [Mσ is Nσ]Xσ.
If Mσ = Nσ then
[Mσ is Nσ]Xσ ≡ Xσ (5)
Thus
([Mσ is Nσ]Pσ)dOe = PσdOe (5)
≤ QσdOe (2)
= ([Mσ is Nσ]Qσ)dOe (5)
If Mσ 6= Nσ then [Mσ is Nσ]Xσ ≡ 0 so
C[P ]σ ≡ C[Q]σ
and the relation still holds.
(7) C = let 〈x, y〉 = M in []. Similar to the previous case.
We showed that v◦ is a precongruence, and for any relation R if R◦ is a pre-
congruence on open processes then R is a precongruence on closed processes.
2
The following lemma states that all probabilistic choices can be made in the
beginning of the execution.
Lemma 8 Let P,Q be piprob processes and p ∈ [0, 1]. Then for all contexts C:
C[P +p Q] ≈ C[P ] +p C[Q]
where ≈ is the equivalence induced by v.
Proof. Let O be a test. If the execution of C[P +pQ] | O does not contain the
transition of P +p Q to one of its operands then C[P +p Q]dOe = C[P ]dOe =
C[Q]dOe and the result comes immediately from lemma 4.
If not, we show that for each execution C[P +p Q] | O →→
r
R there is an
execution (C[P ] +p C[Q]) | O →→
r
R with the same probability. Since the
11
execution contains a transition of P +p Q it will be of the form:
C[P +p Q] | O →→
r1
C1[P +p Q] −→
p
C1[P ]→→
r2
R
(or correspondingly for Q). The probability of this execution is r1 · p · r2. We
can create an execution of the same probability for (C[P ] +p C[Q]) | O as
follows:
(C[P ] +p C[Q]) | O −→
p
C[P ] | O →→
r1
C1[P ] | O →→
r2
R
2
Finally, the following corollary is a consequence of lemmas 7 and 8.
Corollary 9 vp is a precongruence on closed processes, that is for all contexts
C and all closed processes P1, P2, Q1, Q2
(P1, P2) vp (Q1, Q2)⇒ (C[P1], C[P2]) vp (C[Q1], C[Q2])
Proof. Let P1, P2, Q1, Q2 be processes such that P1 +p P2 v Q1 +p Q2 and C
be a context. Since v is a congruence we have C[P1+p P2] v C[Q1+pQ2] and
by lemma 8 C[P1] +p C[P2] v C[Q1] +p C[Q2]. 2
3 Probabilistic Security Protocols
In this section we discuss probabilistic security protocols based on the Obliv-
ious Transfer and we show how to model them using the piprob-calculus.
3.1 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer
The Oblivious Transfer is a primitive operation used in various probabilistic
security protocols. In this particular version a sender A sends exactly one of the
messagesM1,M2 to a receiver B. The latter receives i andMi where i is 1 or 2,
each with probability 1/2. Moreover A should get no information about which
message was received by B. More precisely the protocol OT 12(A,B,M1,M2)
should satisfy the following conditions:
(1) If A executes OT 12(A,B,M1,M2) properly then B receives exactly one
message, (1,M1) or (2,M2), each with probability 1/2.
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(2) After the execution of OT 12(A,B,M1,M2), if it is properly executed, for
A the probability that B got Mi remains 1/2.
(3) If A deviates from the protocol, in order to increase his probability of
learning what B received, then B can detect his attempt with probability
at least 1/2.
It is worth noting that in the literature the reception of the index i by B is
often not mentioned, at least not explicitly ([6]). However, omitting the index
can lead to possible attacks. Consider the case where A executes (properly)
OT 12(M1,M1). Then B will receive M1 with probability one, but he cannot
distinguish it from the case where he receives M1 as a result of OT 12(M1,M2).
So A is forcing B to receive M1. We will see that, in the case of the PSE
protocol, A could exploit this situation in order to get an unfair advantage.
Note that the condition 3 does not apply to this situation since this cannot be
considered as a deviation from the Oblivious Transfer. A generic implementa-
tion of the Oblivious Transfer could not detect such behavior since A executes
OT properly, the problem lies only in the data being transferred.
Using the indexes, however, solves the problem since B will receive (2,M1)
with probability one half. This is distinguishable from any outcome of OT 12(M1,
M1) so, in the case of PSE, B could detect that he’s being cheated. Imple-
mentations of the Oblivious Transfer do provide the index information, even
though sometimes it is not mentioned ([6]). In other formulations of the OT
the receiver can actually select which message he wants to receive, so this
problem is irrelevant.
Encoding in the piprob-calculus. The Oblivious Transfer can be imple-
mented in the piprob-calculus, using the probabilistic choice operator. In order
to make it impossible to cheat, a server process is used to coordinate the
transfer. The processes of the sender and the server are the following:
OT 12(m1,m2, cas)
∆
= casm1.casm2.0
S(cas, csb)
∆
= cas(m1).cas(m2).(cbs〈1,m1〉+0.5 cbs〈2,m2〉)
where m1,m2 are the names to be sent. cas is a channel private to A and S
and csb a channel private to B and S. Each agent communicates only with the
server and not directly with the other agent. B receives the message from the
server (which should be in parallel with A and B) by making an input action
on csb.
It is easy to see that these processes correctly implement the Oblivious Trans-
fer. The only requirement is that A should not contain csb, so that he can only
communicate with B through the server.
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PSE (A,B, {ai}i, {bi}i) {
for i = 1 to n do
OT 12(A,B, ai, ai+n)
OT 12(B,A, bi, bi+n)
next
for j = 1 to m do
for i = 1 to 2n do
A sends jth bit of ai to B
for i = 1 to 2n do
B sends jth bit of bi to A
next
}
Fig. 3. Partial Secrets Exchange protocol
3.2 Partial Secrets Exchange Protocol
This protocol is the core of three probabilistic protocols for contract signing,
certified email and coin tossing, all presented in [6]. It involves two agents, each
having 2n secrets split in pairs, (a1, an+1), ..., (an, a2n) for A and (b1, bn+1), ...,
(bn, b2n) for B. Each secret consists of m bits. The purpose is to exchange a
single pair of secrets under the constraint that, if at a specific time B has one
of A’s pairs, then with high probability A should also have one of B’s pairs
and vice versa.
The protocol, displayed in figure 3, consists of two parts. During the first A
and B exchange their pairs of secrets using OT 12 . After this step A knows
exactly one half of each of B’s pairs and vice versa. During the second part,
all secrets are exchanged bit per bit. Half of the received bits are already
known from the first step, so both agents can check whether they are valid.
Obviously, if both A and B execute the protocol properly then all secrets are
revealed.
The problem arises when B tries to cheat and sends incorrectly some of his
secrets. In this case it can be proved that with high probability some of the
tests of A will fail causing A to stop the execution of the protocol and avoid
revealing his secrets. The idea is that, in order for B to cheat, he must send at
least one half of each of his pairs incorrectly. However he cannot know which
of the two halves is already received by A during the first part of the protocol.
So a pair sent incorrectly will only have one half probability of being accepted
by A, leading to a total 2−n probability of success.
Now imagine, as discussed in section 3.1, that B executes OT 12(B,A, bi, bi),
thus forcing A to receive bi. Now, in the second part, he can send all {bi+n | 1 ≤
i ≤ n} incorrectly without failing any test. Moreover A cannot detect this
situation. If indexes are available A will receive (2, bi+n) with probability one
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half and since he knows that bi+n is not the second half of the corresponding
pair he will stop the protocol.
Encoding in the piprob-calculus. In this paragraph we present an encoding
of the PSE protocol in the piprob-calculus. Before giving the corresponding
process there are two points worth discussing.
• The secrets exchanged by PSE should be recognizable, which means that
agent A cannot compute B’s secrets, but he can recognize them when he
receives them. Of course a secret can be recognized only as a whole, no
single bit can be recognized by itself. To implement this feature we allow
B’s secrets to appear in A’s process, as if A knew them. However we allow
a secret to appear only as a whole (not decomposed) and only inside a
test construct, which means that it can only be used to recognize another
message.
• In our analysis we need to detect the fact that an agent sends a specific
bit in a certain position of a specific message. Thus, in the implementation
of PSE, each parameter aij (resp. bij) is considered to take values from the
domain {0ij, 1ij}, where 0ij (resp. 1ij) is a public channel but different for
each i, j.
Note that having secrets composed by public bits can lead to guessing
attacks by non-deterministic adversaries. Many analysis tools for security
protocols, such as the spi-calculus, do not allow the decomposition of secrets
to avoid such guesses. In our analysis, however, we express the correctness of
a protocol as the equivalence with a properly constructed specification. This
only proves that the protocol will not reveal any secrets and is not related
with the adversary’s ability of guessing the secrets without interfering with
any partner (of course, this is known to happen with very small probability).
Such attacks will apply to both the protocol and the specification.
The encoding for the general case of n pairs andm bits per message is displayed
in figure 4. We denote by ai (resp. bi) the i-th secret of A (resp. B) and by
aij (resp. bij) the j-th bit of ai (resp. bi). ri is the i-th message received by
Oblivious Transfer and ki is the corresponding index.
The first part consists of the first 4 lines of the process definition. In this part
A sends his pairs using OT 12 , receives the ones of B and decomposes them.
To check the received messages A starts a loop of n steps, each of which is
guarded by an input action on qi for synchronization. During the i-th step, ri
is tested against bi or bi+n depending on the outcome of the OT, that is on
the value of ki. The qsi channels are used to send the values to test to the
TestOT sub-process. 3
3 Note that we use the syntax c(〈x1, . . . , xn〉).P for c(x).let 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 = x in P .
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A({aij}i=1..2n,j=1..m, {bi}i=1..2n) ∆=∏n
i=1OT 12(〈ai1, . . . , aim〉, 〈a(i+n)1, . . . , a(i+n)m〉, casi) |
csa1(〈k1, r1〉).let 〈r11, . . . , r1m〉 = r1 in . . . csan(〈kn, rn〉).let 〈rn1, . . . , rnm〉 = rn in
νq1 . . . νqn+1(q1 | ∏ni=1 qi(x).νqsi(qsi〈ki, ri〉 | TestOT (i)) |
qn+1(x).νs1 . . . νsm+1(s1 |∏m
j=1 sj(x).cpa1j. . . . cpa(2n)j.cp(d1j). . . . cp(d(2n)j).
νt1 . . . νtn+1(t1 |∏n
i=1 ti(x).νtsi(tsi〈ki, rij, dij, d(i+n)j〉 | Test(i, j)) |
tn+1(x).sj+1) |
sm+1(x).cpok))
TestOT (i)
∆
= qsi(〈k, w〉).([k is 1][w is bi]qi+1 | [k is 2][w is bi+n]qi+1)
Test(i, j)
∆
= tsi(〈k, w, x, y〉).([k is 1][w is x]ti+1 | [k is 2][w is y]ti+1)
Fig. 4. Encoding of PSE protocol
The second part consists of a loop of m steps, each of which is guarded by an
input action on sj. During each step the j-th bit of each secret is sent and the
corresponding bits of B are received in dij. Then there is a nested loop of n
tests controlled by the input actions on ti. Each test, performed by the Test
subprocess, ensures that B’s bits are valid. Test(i, j) checks the j-th bit of
the i-th pair. The bit received during the first part, namely rij, is compared
to dij or d(i+n)j depending on ki. If the bit is valid, an output action on ti+1
is performed to continue to the next test. Again, the tsi channels are used to
send the necessary values to the Test sub-process.
Finally, an instance of the protocol is an agent A put in parallel with servers
for all oblivious transfers:
I
∆
= A({aij}i=1..2n,j=1..m, {bi}i=1..2n) |
n∏
i=1
(S(casi , csbi) | S(cbsi , csai))
4 Verification of Security Properties
A well known method for expressing and proving security properties using
process calculi is by means of specifications. A specification Pspec of a protocol
P is a process which is simple enough in order to prove (or accept) that it
models the correct behavior of the protocol. Then the correctness of P is
implied by P ' Pspec where ' is a testing equivalence. The idea is that, if
there exists an attack for P , this attack can be modeled by a test O which
performs the attack and outputs ω if it succeeds. Then P should pass the test
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and since P ' Pspec, Pspec should also pass it, which is a contradiction (no
attack exists for Pspec).
However, in case of probabilistic protocols, attacks do exist but only succeed
with a very small probability. So examining only the ability of passing a test is
not sufficient since the fact that Pspec has an attack is no longer contradictory.
Instead we will use a specification which can be shown to have very small
probability of been attacked and we will express the correctness of P as P v
Pspec where v is the testing preorder defined in section 2.4. Then an attack of
high probability for P should be applicable with at least the same probability
for Pspec which is contradictory.
4.1 Specifications for PSE
Let us recall the fairness property for the PSE protocol.
If B receives one of A’s pairs then with high probability A should also be
able to receive one of B’s pairs.
First of all we must point out two important differences between this type of
protocols and the traditional cryptographic ones.
• In traditional protocols both A and B are considered honest. The purpose of
the protocol is to ensure that no outside adversary can access the messages
being transferred.
On the other hand, in PSE the adversary is B himself, who might try to
deviate from the protocol in order to get A’s secrets without revealing his
own ones.
• In traditional protocols the secrets must remain secret all the time. A and
B always perform the same actions and always want to communicate with
each other.
On the other hand in PSE A shows different behavior when B is honest
than in case of an attempt to cheat. A is willing to reveal his secrets, only
when B wants the same too.
A specification that depends on the behavior of B A specification of a
protocol shows the correct behavior of the agents. Since A’s behavior depends
on B it makes sense to have different specifications depending on B’s behavior.
In [3] we proposed a specification for PSE that shows A’s behavior when B
is trying to cheat and, moreover, depends on how B is cheating. To model
B’s intention to cheat we use a function h : {1..n} 7→ {1..m} that shows on
which bit B is going to cheat for each pair. So h(3) = 4 means that B is going
to send the 4th bit of (at least) one of the 3rd pair’s secrets incorrectly. We
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Aspec({aij}i=1..2n,j=1..m, h) ∆=∏n
i=1OT 12(〈ai1, . . . , aim〉, 〈a(i+n)1, . . . , a(i+n)m〉, casi) |
csa1(x) . . . csan(x).
νq1 . . . νqn+1(q1 | ∏ni=1 qi(x).νqsi(qsi〈x, x〉 | TestOTspec(i)) |
qn+1(x).νs1 . . . νsm+1(s1 |∏m
j=1 sj(x).cpa1j. . . . cpa(2n)j.cp(x). . . . cp(x).
νt1 . . . νtn+1(t1 |∏n
i=1 ti(x).νtsi(tsi〈x, x, x, x〉 | Testspec(i, j, h)) |
tn+1(x).sj+1) |
sm+1(x).cpok))
TestOTspec(i)
∆
= qsi(x).qi+1
Testspec(i, j, h)
∆
=
 tsi(x).(ti+1 +0.5 0) if h(i) = jtsi(x).ti+1 otherwise
Fig. 5. A specification for PSE that depends on B’s behavior
consider “cheating” to be a deviation from the protocol in a way that leads
to a violation of fairness. Thus, in order for B to cheat h must be defined on
its whole domain. The goal is to exchange just one pair, if at least one pair is
sent correctly by B then fairness is not violated.
The specification is displayed in figure 5. As already discussed, it depends on
B’s cheating behavior, that is on the function h. The specification resembles
a lot the protocol, with two major differences:
(1) The specification does not use any of its input (all input variables are
replaced by x to point out this fact). Moreover bi’s are no longer used
(thus they are removed from the parameter list).
(2) The specification does not test the received bits. In the first part, TestOTspec
accepts all messages. In the second, Testspec accepts all bits, except those
on which B is known to cheat, which are accepted only with probability
one half.
Using this specification we can prove the correctness of PSE. We can first show
that the specification satisfies fairness. Then we can show that the original
protocol is weaker (wrt the testing preorder defined in section 2.4) than the
specification if we consider only tests who cheat based on h. More details
about this method can be found in [4].
However there is an important drawback of this approach. The specification is
not unique but there are many different versions, one for each possible function
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Aspec({aij}i=1..2n,j=1..m, {bi}i=1..2n) ∆=∏n
i=1OT 12(〈ai1, . . . , aim〉, 〈a(i+n)1, . . . , a(i+n)m〉, casi) |
csa1(x) . . . csan(x).
νq1 . . . νqn+1(q1 | ∏ni=1 qi(x).νqsi(qsi〈x, x〉 | TestOTspec(i)) |
qn+1(x).νs1 . . . νsm+1(s1 |∏n
i=1(!guessi +0.5 0) |∏m
j=1 sj(x).cpa1j. . . . cpa(2n)j.cp(d1j). . . . cp(d(2n)j).
νt1 . . . νtn+1(t1 |∏n
i=1 ti(x).νtsi(tsi〈x, x, dij, d(i+n)j〉 | Testspec(i, j)) |
tn+1(x).sj+1) |
sm+1(x).cpok))
TestOTspec(i)
∆
= qsi(x).qi+1
Testspec(i, j)
∆
= tsi(〈k, w, x, y〉).([x is bij][y is b(i+n)j]ti+1 | guessi(x).ti+1)
Fig. 6. A unique specification for the PSE protocol
h. To prove the correctness of PSE one should consider all these specifications
and prove that the original protocol is weaker than each of them. A new
approach that overcomes this problem is discussed in the following section.
A unique specification for PSE In the specification given in the previous
section, we allowed the process to know which bit will be sent incorrectly by B.
This, however, led to many different specifications depending on the function
h. A different approach is to allow the process to know the message that it is
about to receive. So, it can actually test whether it is being cheated or not,
without knowing it beforehand. However the tests should not be strict. Even
if B is sending incorrect data, the specification should accept it with a certain
probability, in order to simulate the actual protocol.
The new specification is displayed in figure 6. As already discussed it does not
depend on h but it contains B’s secret messages. Like the previous specifi-
cation, it differs from the original protocol only on the definition of TestOT
and Test. The former accepts all messages without any test (as in the previ-
ous specification). The latter, however, tests all incoming bits against the real
ones. If the bits are correct they are accepted. However, even if the bits are
not correct they can be accepted if an input on channel guesssi is possible.
This channel denotes the fact that B was able to guess which part of pair i
was received by A, thus he can send the other part incorrectly without being
detected. This should happen with probability one half for each pair, which is
modeled by the subprocess
∏n
i=1(!guessi +0.5 0) that runs in parallel with the
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tests. Note that the guess is made once for each pair, if succeeded then B can
send all bits of the corresponding pair incorrectly without being detected.
It is worth noting that, even though this specification seems complicated, it
was constructed using a standard technique, the same that is used to prove
authenticity in [1]. Namely, when we want to prove that an agent receives a
message correctly, we can replace the received message by the correct one, as if
he already knew it. The above specification is intuitively fair since A at each
step can verify with high probability that he received B’s secrets correctly
before proceeding to the next step.
In the rest of the paper we are only considering this improved version of the
specification and we use it to prove the correctness of PSE. To achieve that we
first show that the specification satisfies the fairness property. Then we prove
that the original protocol is weaker than this specification wrt the testing
preorder.
4.2 Proving the correctness of PSE
Correctness of the specification. First we show that the specification is
indeed a proper specification for PSE with respect to fairness. This means
that, if B does not reveal his secrets then A should reveal his own ones with
very small probability. So suppose that B wants to cheat and let l be the
maximum number of bits that B is willing to reveal for his secrets. So, since
one pair is enough for A, B should send at least one of the first l + 1 bits of
each of his pairs incorrectly.
As we already discussed Aspec knows all the correct bits of B’s secrets and
he can test them when they are received. The sub-process Testspec(i, j) will
succeed with probability 1 if bij and b(i+n)j are sent correctly, but only with
probability 1/2 if not (since channel guessi is activated only with probability
1/2). If the test fails then the whole process stalls. Since incorrect bits will be
sent for all pairs in the first l + 1 steps, the total probability of advancing to
step l + 2 and reveal its l + 2 bits is 2−n.
This means that Aspec satisfies fairness. If B at some point of the protocol has
l bits of one of A’s pairs, then with probability at least 1 − 2−n A will have
l − 1 bits of at least one of B’s pairs. If l = m (B has a whole pair) then A
should have at least m − 1 bits and the last bit can be easily computed by
trying both 0 and 1. In other words B cannot gain an advantage of more than
one bit with probability greater than 2−n.
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Relation between A and Aspec. Having proved the correctness of the spec-
ification with respect to fairness, it remains to show its relation with the orig-
inal protocol. Proving A v Aspec means to prove that if A is vulnerable with
high probability to an attack O, then Aspec will be also vulnerable with at
least the same probability. Since we know that the probability of a successful
attack for Aspec is very small, we can conclude that an attack on A is very
unlikely.
An instance of the specification is a process Aspec put in parallel with servers
for all oblivious transfers:
Ispec
∆
= Aspec({aij}i=1..2n,j=1..m, {bi}i=1..2n) |
n∏
i=1
(S(casi , csbi) | S(cbsi , csai))
PSE will be considered correct wrt fairness if:
I v Ispec
Theorem 10 PSE is correct with respect to fairness.
Proof. We want to prove that I v Ispec. The two processes differ only in
TestOT and Test sub-processes. We define Iw to be the same as I after re-
placing TestOT with TestOTw and Test with Testw defined as:
TestOTw(i)
∆
=
TestOT (i) if i ≥ wTestOTspec(i) otherwise
Testw(i, j)
∆
=
Test(i, j) if i ≥ wTestspec(i, j) otherwise
The idea is that Iw behaves as the specification for the first w−1 pairs and as
the original protocol for the other ones. Since I = I1 and Ispec = In+1 we can
prove the correctness of PSE by induction on w and it suffices to show that
Iw v Iw+1 ∀w ∈ {1..n} (6)
Iw and Iw+1 differ only in the TestOTw(i) and Testw(i, j) subprocesses for
i = w. Concerning TestOT we have:
TestOTw(w, j)= qsi(〈k, w〉).
([k is 1][w is bi]qw+1 | [k is 2][w is bi+n]qw+1)
TestOTw+1(w, j)= qsi(x).qw+1
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Since k can only have one value, the one branch of TestOTw(w, j) will stall.
So TestOTw+1 is the same as TestOTw except that it doesn’t test anything,
so it is easy to see that TestOTw v TestOTw+1.
Since v is a precongruence, we can replace the TestOTw sub-processes in Iw
by TestOTw+1. If K is the resulting process, we have that Iw v K. Now K and
Iw+1 differ only in Testw process. However Testw is not smaller than Testw+1
so we cannot replace the first by the second.
In order to overcome this problem we notice that rw and kw was received
through the csaw channel. Since we suppose that only A contains any of the
csai channels, rw must have been transfered using the Oblivious Transfer server
S(bsw, saw). This process receives two values m1,m2 and sends one of them,
each with probability one half. We suppose that m1 = bw and m2 = bw+n,
that is the correct w-th pair of B has been sent by the Oblivious Transfer
(otherwise TestOT (w) would stall with probability at least one half and we
could easily prove Iw v Iw+1). So rw will be equal to bw (and kw = 1) or bw+n
(and kw = 2), each with probability one half.
We define:
P1=
m∏
j=1
tsw(〈k, w, x, y〉).([1 is 1][bwj is x]tw+1 | [1 is 2][bwj is y]tw+1)
≡
m∏
j=1
tsw(〈k, w, x, y〉).[bwj is x]tw+1
P2=
m∏
j=1
tsw(〈k, w, x, y〉).([2 is 1][b(w+n)j is x]tw+1 | [2 is 2][b(w+n)j is y]tw+1)
≡
m∏
j=1
tsw(〈k, w, x, y〉).[b(w+n)j is y]tw+1
Also let
Q=(
m∏
j=1
Testw+1(w, j)) | (!guessw +0.5 0)
=
m∏
j=1
tsw(〈k, w, x, y〉).([x is bwj][y is b(w+n)j]tw+1 | guessw(x).tw+1) |
(!guessw +0.5 0)
We can show that P1 +0.5 P2 v Q +0.5 Q. Both processes can perform only
tw+1 actions. With probability one half, guessw will be activated and Q can
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perform all actions without testing. So if P1 +0.5 P2 passes a test with greater
probability than Q +0.5 Q then this probability should be more than 1/2 so
both P1 and P2 should pass it. But in this case the corresponding tests of
P1, P2 should succeed which means that x = bwj and y = b(w+n)j so the test
of Q should also succeed. So
P1 +0.5 P2 v Q+0.5 Q (7)
Finally let C be a context constructed from K by replacing Testw with a
hole. By lemma 8 we can perform the choice of the oblivious transfer in
the beginning, so K will be testing equivalent to C[P1] +0.5 C[P2]. Moreover
C[Q] +0.5 C[Q] will be testing equivalent to Iw+1. By corollary 9 and equation
(7) we have C[P1] +0.5 C[P2] v C[Q] +0.5 C[Q] which implies K v Iw+1.
Since Iw v K, the equation (6) is true and we can finish the proof by an
induction on w. 2
5 Related Work
Security protocols have been extensively studied during the last decade and
many formal methods have been proposed for their analysis. However, the
vast majority of these methods refer to non-deterministic protocols and are
not suitable for the probabilistic setting, since they do not allow to model
random choices. One exception is the work of Aldini and Gorrieri ([2]), where
they use a probabilistic process algebra to analyze fairness in a non-reputation
protocol. Their work is close to ours in spirit, although technically it is quite
different. In particular, we base our analysis on a notion of testing while theirs
is based on a notion of bisimulation.
With respect to the application, the results the most related to ours come from
Norman and Schmatikov ([11], [12]), who use probabilistic model checking to
study fairness in two probabilistic protocols, including the Partial Exchange
Protocol. In particular, in [12] they model the PSE using Prism, a probabilis-
tic model checker. Their treatment however is very different from ours: their
model describes only the “correct” behavior for both A and B, as specified
by the protocol. B’s ability to cheat is limited to prematurely stopping the
execution, so attacks in which B deviates completely from the protocol are not
taken into account. Having a simplified model is important in model checking
since it helps overcoming the search state explosion problem, thus making the
verification feasible.
The results in [12] show that with probability one B can gain a one bit advan-
tage, that is he can get all m bits of a pair of A by revealing only m− 1 bits
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of his. This is achieved simply by stopping the execution after receiving the
last bit from A. Moreover a method of overcoming the problem is proposed,
which gives this advantage to A or B, each with probability one half. Is is
worth noting that this is a very weak form of attack and could be considered
as negligible, since A can compute the last bit very easily by trying both 0 and
1. Besides a one bit advantage will always exist in contract signing protocols,
simply because synchronous communication is not feasible.
In our approach, by modeling an adversary as an arbitrary piprob process we
allow him to perform a vast range of attacks including sending messages, per-
forming calculations, monitoring public channels etc. Our analysis shows not
only that a one bit attack is possible, but more important that no attack to
obtain an advantage of two or more bits exists with non-negligible probabil-
ity. Moreover our method has the advantage of being easily extendable. For
example, treating more sessions, even an infinite number of ones, can be done
by putting many copies of the processes in parallel.
Of course, the major advantage of the model checking approach, with respect
to ours, is that it can be totally automated.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we examined a method to analyze probabilistic security proto-
cols using process calculi. The main tool for this analysis is the piprob-calculus,
a probabilistic variant of the pi-calculus. The probabilistic choice, provided by
piprob, allowed us to encode the Partial Exchange Protocol, a probabilistic pro-
tocol based on the Oblivious Transfer. In order to prove the correctness of this
protocol, we defined various preorders between piprob processes and examined
their properties. Then we presented a properly constructed specification and
showed that it is stronger than the original protocol, thus proving that the
possibility of success for any attack is very small.
Our results show that process calculi techniques can be successfully applied to
security protocol analysis. There are various advantages of this approach. First
of all the use of process calculi allows us to use the rich set of concepts and tech-
niques developed by the concurrency theory community. The proofs obtained
are general, covering every possible adversary and are not instance-based as
in model checking techniques. Moreover process calculi allow the analysis of a
protocol in a more complex environment, having for example many agents and
multiple simultaneous instances of a protocol. It is worth noting that many
attacks of well known protocols only appear in such situations.
In [5] an algorithm for deciding may-testing is presented, for fully probabilistic
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automata. We believe that this result can be extended to the probabilistic
automata defined in section 1.2, giving the ability of automatically proving
the correctness of probabilistic security protocols.
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